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Abstract
This paper focuses on compact deterministic self-stabilizing solutions for the leader elec-
tion problem. When the protocol is required to be silent (i.e., when communication content
remains fixed from some point in time during any execution), there exists a lower bound of
Ω(log n) bits of memory per node participating to the leader election (where n denotes the
number of nodes in the system). This lower bound holds even in rings. We present a new de-
terministic (non-silent) self-stabilizing protocol for n-node rings that uses only O(log log n)
memory bits per node, and stabilizes in O(n log2 n) rounds. Our protocol has several attrac-
tive features that make it suitable for practical purposes. First, the communication model
fits with the model used by existing compilers for real networks. Second, the size of the
ring (or any upper bound on this size) needs not to be known by any node. Third, the
node identifiers can be of various sizes. Finally, no synchrony assumption, besides a weakly
fair scheduler, is assumed. Therefore, our result shows that, perhaps surprisingly, trading
silence for exponential improvement in term of memory space does not come at a high cost
regarding stabilization time or minimal assumptions.
∗A preliminary version of this paper has appeared in [9, 10].
†Additional support from the ANR project IRIS.
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1 Introduction
This paper is targeting the issue of designing efficient self-stabilization algorithm for the leader
election problem. Self-stabilization [15, 16, 32] is a general paradigm to provide forward recovery
capabilities to distributed systems and networks. Intuitively, a protocol is self-stabilizing if it is
able to recover from any transient failure, without external intervention. Leader election is one
of the fundamental building blocks of distributed computing, as it enables to distinguish a single
node in the system, and thus to perform specific actions using that node. Leader election is
especially important in the context of self-stabilization as many protocols for various problems
assume that a single leader exists in the system, even when faults occur. Hence, a self-stabilizing
leader election mechanism enables to run such protocols in networks where no leader is a priori
given, by using simple composition techniques [16].
Most of the literature in self-stabilization is dedicated to improving efficiency after failures
occur, including minimizing the stabilization time, i.e., the maximum amount of time one has
to wait before recovering from a failure. While stabilization time is meaningful to evaluate the
efficiency of an algorithm in the presence of failures, it does not necessarily capture the overhead
of self-stabilization when there are no faults [1], or after stabilization. Another important
criterion to evaluate this overhead is the memory space used by each node. This criterion is
motivated by two practical reasons, that we detail below.
First, self-stabilizing protocols require that some communications carry on forever (in order
to be able to detect distributed inconsistencies due to transient failures [7, 14]). Therefore,
minimizing the memory space used by each node enables to minimize the amount of information
that is exchanged between nodes. Indeed, protocols are typically written in the state model,
where the state of each node is read by each of its neighbors. (The use of the state model
is motivated by the fact that all existing stabilization-preserving compilers [4, 11, 12, 31] are
precisely designed for this model).
Second, minimizing memory space enables to significantly reduce the cost of redundancy
when mixing self-stabilization and replication, in order to increase the probability of masking
or containing transient faults [22, 23]. For instance, duplicating every bit three times at each
node permits to withstand one randomly flipped bit. More generally, decreasing the memory
space allows the designer to duplicate this memory many times, in order to tolerate many
random bit-flips.
A foundational result regarding memory space in the context of self-stabilization is due to
Dolev et al. [17], which states that, n-node networks, Ω(log n) bits of memory are required for
solving global tasks such as leader election. Importantly, this bound holds even for the ring.
A key component of this lower bound is that the protocol is assumed to be silent. (Recall
that a protocol is silent if each of its executions reaches a point in time beyond which the
registers containing the information available at each node do not change). The lower bound
can be extended to non-silent protocols, but only for protocols with restricted capabilities. For
instance, it holds in anonymous (and uniform) unidirectional rings, even of prime size [8, 21].
As a matter of fact, most deterministic self-stabilizing leader election protocols [2, 3, 5, 13, 18]
use at least Ω(log n) bits of memory per node. Indeed, either these protocols directly compare
node identifiers (and thus communicate node identifiers to neighbors), or they compute some
variant of a hop-count distance to the elected node (and this distance can be as large as Ω(n)
to be accurate).
A few previous work [26, 27, 30] managed to break the Ω(log n) bits lower bound for the
memory space of self-stabilizing leader election algorithms. Nevertheless, the corresponding
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algorithms exhibit shortcomings that hinder their relevance to practical applications. For in-
stance, the algorithm by Mayer et al. [30], by Itkis and Levin [26], and by Awerbuch and
Ostrovstky [6] use a constant number of bits per node only. However, these algorithms guaran-
tee probabilistic self-stabilization only (in the Las Vegas sense). In particular, the stabilization
time is only expected to be polynomial in the size of the network. Moreover, these algorithms
are designed for a communication model that is more powerful than the classical state model
used in this paper. (The state model is the model used in most available compilers for actual
networks [4, 11, 12, 31]). More specifically, Mayer et al. [30] use the message passing model,
and Awerbuch and Ostrovsky [6] use the link-register model, where communications between
neighboring nodes are carried out through dedicated registers. Finally, Itkis and Levin [26] use
the state model augmented with reciprocal pointer to neighbors. In this model, not only a node
u is able to distinguish a particular neighbor v (which can be done using local labeling), but
also this distinguished neighbor v is aware that it has been selected by u. Implementing this
mutual interaction between neighbors typically requires distance-two coloring, link coloring, or
two-hops communication. All these techniques are impacting the memory space requirement
significantly [29]. It is also important to note that the communication models in [6, 26, 30] allow
nodes to send different information to different neighbors, while this capability is beyond the
power of the classical state model. The ability to send different messages to different neighbors
is a strong assumption in the context of self-stabilization. It anables to construct a “path of
information” that is consistent between nodes. This path is typically used to distribute the
storage of information along a path, in order to reduce the information stored at each node.
However, this assumption prevents the user from taking advantage of the existing compilers.
So implementing the protocols in [6, 26, 30] to actual networks requires to rewrite all the codes
from scratch.
To our knowledge, the only deterministic self-stabilizing leader election protocol using sub-
logarithmic memory space in the classical state model is due to Itkis et al. [27]. Their elegant
algorithm uses only a constant number of bits per node, and stabilizes in O(n2) time in n-node
rings. However, the algorithm relies on several restricting assumptions. First, the algorithm
works properly only if the size of the ring is prime. Second, it assumes that, at any time, a single
node is scheduled for execution, that is, it assumes a central scheduler [20]. Such a scheduler
is far less practical than the classical distributed scheduler, which allows any set of processes to
be scheduled concurrently for execution. Third, the algorithm in [27] assumes that the ring is
oriented. That is, every node is supposed to possess a consistent notion of left and right. This
orientation permits to mimic the behavior of reciprocal pointer to neighbors mentioned above.
Extending the algorithm by Itkis et al. [27] to more practical settings, i.e., to non-oriented
rings of arbitrary size, to the use of a distributed scheduler, etc, is not trivial if one wants to
preserve a sub-logarithmic memory space at each node. For example, the existing transformers
enabling to enhance protocols designed for the central scheduler in order to operate under the
distributed scheduler require Θ(log n) memory at each node [20]. Similarly, self-stabilizing ring-
orientation protocols exist, but those preserving sub-logarithmic memory space either works only
in rings of odd size for deterministic guarantees [24], or just provide probabilistic guarantees [25].
Moreover, in both cases, the stabilization time is O(n2), which is quite large.
To summarize, all existing self-stabilizing leader election algorithm designed in a practical
communication model, and for rings of arbitrary size, without a priori orientation, use Ω(log n)
bits of memory per node. Breaking this bound, without introducing any kind of restriction on
the settings, requires, beside being non-silent, a completely new approach.
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Our results
In this paper, we present a deterministic (non-silent) self-stabilizing leader election algorithm
that operates under the distributed scheduler in non-anonymous undirected rings of arbitrary
size. Our algorithm is non-silent to circumvent the lower bound Ω(log n) bits of memory per
node in [17]. It uses only O(log log n) bits of memory per node, and stabilizes in O(n log2 n)
time.
Unlike the algorithms in [6, 26, 30], our algorithm is deterministic, and designed to run
under the classical state-sharing communication model (a.k.a. state model), which allows it to
be implemented by using actual compilers [4, 11, 12, 31]. Unlike [27], the size of the ring is
arbitrary, the ring is not assumed to be oriented, and the scheduler is distributed. Moreover the
stabilization time of our algorithm is significantly smaller than the one in [27]. Similarly to [6,
26, 28, 30], our algorithm uses a technique to distribute the information among nearby nodes
along a sub-path of the ring. However, our algorithm does not rely on powerful communication
models such as the ones used in [6, 26, 30]. Those powerful communication models make easy
the construction and management of such sub-paths. The use of the classical state-sharing
model makes the construction and management of the sub-paths much more difficult.
Besides the use of a sub-logarithmic memory space, and beside a quasi-linear stabilization
time, our algorithm possesses several attractive features. First, the size (or any upper bound
for this size) need not to be known by any node. Second, the node identifiers (or identities) can
be of various sizes (to model, e.g., Internet networks running different versions of IP). Third,
no synchrony assumption besides weak fairness is assumed (a node that is continuously enabled
for execution is eventually scheduled for execution).
At a high level, our algorithm is essentially based on two techniques. One consists in
electing the leader by comparing the identities of the nodes, bitwise, which requires special
care, especially when the node identities can be of various sizes. The second technique consists
in maintaining and merging trees based on a parenthood relation, and verifying the absence of
cycles in the 1-factor induced by this parenthood relation. This verification is performed using
small memory space by grouping the nodes in hyper-nodes of appropriate size. Each hyper-
node handles an integer encoding a distance to a root. The bits of this distance are distributed
among the nodes of the hyper-nodes to preserve a small memory per node. Difficulties arise
when one needs to perform arithmetic operations on these distributed bits, especially in the
context where nodes are unaware of the size of the ring. The precise design of our algorithm
requires overcoming many other difficulties due to the need of maintaining correct information
in an environment subject to arbitrary faults.
In addition, we took care of designing our algorithm to be ready for implementation, i.e., we
do not only describe a conceptual protocol, but also produce a concrete self-stabilizing leader
election protocol. This article provides a high level description of our algorithm, a detailed
description of the protocol, and a complete proof of correctness.1 To sum up, our result shows
that, perhaps surprisingly, trading silence for exponential improvement in term of memory space
does not come at a high cost regarding stabilization time, neither it does regarding minimal
assumptions about the communication framework.
1Moreover, the reader is invited to consult www-npa.lip6.fr/˜blin/Election/ where a video of the dynamic
execution of the protocol is presented. This video is the result of a complete implementation of the protocol.
The video execution is using a randomized distributed scheduler. The initial configuration is illegitimate, and
the video displays the protocol operation towards a legitimate configuration.
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2 Model and definitions
2.1 Program syntax and semantics
A distributed system consists of n processors that form a communication graph. The processors
are represented by the nodes of this graph, and the edges represent pairs of processors that can
communicate directly with each other. Such processors are said to be neighbors. This classical
model is called state-sharing communication model. The distance between two processors is the
length (i.e., number of edges) of the shortest path between them in the communication graph.
Each processor contains variables, and rules. A variable ranges over a fixed domain of values.
A rule is of the form
〈label〉 : 〈guard〉 −→ 〈command〉.
A guard is a boolean predicate over processor variables. A command is a set of variable-
assignments. A command of processor p can only update its own variables. On the other hand,
p can read the variables of its neighbors. An assignment of values to all variables in the system
is called a configuration. A rule whose guard is true in some system configuration is said to be
enabled in this configuration. The rule is disabled otherwise. An atomic execution of a subset
of enabled rules results in a transition of the system from one configuration to another. This
transition is called a step. A run of a distributed system is a sequence of transitions.
2.2 Schedulers
A scheduler, also called daemon, is a restriction on the runs to be considered. The schedulers
differ among them by different execution semantics, and by different fairness in the activation
of the processors [20]. With respect to execution semantics, we consider the least restrictive
scheduler, called the distributed scheduler. In the run of a distributed scheduler, a step can
contain the execution of an arbitrary subset of enabled rules of correct processors. With respect
to fairness, we use the least restrictive scheduler, called weakly fair scheduler. In every run of
the weakly fair scheduler, a rule of a correct processor is executed infinitely often if it is enabled
in all but finitely many configurations of the run. That is, the rule has to be executed only if
it is continuously enabled. A round is the smallest portion of an execution where every process
has the opportunity to execute at least one action.
2.3 Predicates and specifications
A predicate is a boolean function over network configurations. A configuration conforms to
some predicate R, if R evaluates to true in this configuration. The configuration violates the
predicate otherwise. Predicate R is closed in a certain protocol P , if every configuration of a
run of P conforms to R, provided that the protocol starts from a configuration conforming to
R. Note that if a protocol configuration conforms to R, and the configuration resulting from
the execution of any step of P also conforms to R, then R is closed in P .
A specification for a processor p defines a set of configuration sequences. These sequences
are formed by variables of some subset of processors in the system. This subset always includes
p itself. A problem specification, or problem for short, defines specifications for each processor
of the system. A problem specification in the presence of faults defines specifications for correct
processors only. Program P solves problem S under a certain scheduler if every run of P satisfies
the specifications defined by S. A closed predicate I is an invariant of program P with respect
to problem S if every run of P that starts in a state conforming to I satisfies S. Given two
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predicates l1 and l2 for program P with respect to problem S, l2 is an attractor for l1 if every
run that starts from a configuration that conforms to l1 contains a configuration that conforms
to l2. Such a relationship is denoted by
l1 . l2.
A program P is self-stabilizing [15] to specification S if every run of P that starts in an arbitrary
configuration contains a configuration conforming to an invariant of P with respect to problem
S. That is, this invariant is an attractor of predicate true.
2.4 Leader election specification
Consider a system of processors where each processor has a boolean variable leader. We use
the classical definition of leader election, which specifies that, in every protocol run, there is a
suffix where a single processor p has leaderp = true, and every other processor q 6= p satisfies
leaderq = false.
3 A compact leader-election protocol for rings
In this section, we describe our self-stabilizing algorithm for leader election in arbitrary n-
node rings. The algorithm is later proved to use O(log log n) bits of memory per node, and to
stabilize in quasi-linear time, whenever the identities of the nodes are between 1 and nc, for
some c ≥ 1. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the identifiers are in [1, n]. Nevertheless,
the algorithm works without assuming any particular range for the identifiers. We first provide
a general overview of the algorithm, followed by a more detailed description in Section 3.2. All
predicates and commands are postponed in section 3.3.
3.1 Overview of the algorithm
As many existing deterministic self-stabilizing leader election algorithms, our algorithm aims at
electing the node with maximum identity among all nodes, and, simultaneously, at constructing
a spanning tree rooted at the elected node. The main constraint imposed by our wish to use
sub-logarithmic memory is that we cannot exchange or even locally use complete identifiers,
as their size Ω(log n) bits does not fit in a sub-logarithmic size memory. As a matter of fact,
we assume that every node can access the bits of its identifier, but only a constant number
of them can be simultaneously stored and/or communicated to neighbors at any given time.
Our algorithm makes sure that every node stores the current position of a particular bit of the
identifier, referred to as a bit-position in the sequel.
3.1.1 Selection of the leader
Our algorithm operates in phases. At each phase, each node that is a candidate leader v
reveals some bit-position, different from the ones at the previous phases, to its neighbors. More
precisely, let Idv be the identity of node v, and assume that Idv =
∑k
i=0 bi2
i. Let I =
{
i ∈
{0, ..., k}, bi 6= 0
}
be the set of all non-zero bit-positions in the binary representation of Idv. Let
us rewrite I = {p1, ..., pj} with 0 ≤ p1 < p2 < ... < pj ≤ k. Then, during Phase i, i = 1, . . . , j,
node v reveals pj−i+1 to its neighbors, which potentially propagate it to their neighbors, and
possibly to the whole network in subsequent phases. During Phase i, for j+1 ≤ i ≤ blog nc+1,
node v either becomes passive (that is, stops acting as a candidate leader) or remains a candidate
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leader. If, at the beginning of the execution of the algorithm, all nodes are candidate leaders,
then during each phase, some candidate leaders are eliminated, until exactly one candidate
leader remains, which becomes the actual leader. More precisely, let pmax(i) be the most
significant bit-position revealed at Phase i among all nodes. Then, among all candidate leaders
still competing for becoming leader, only those whose bit-position revealed at Phase i is equal
to pmax(i) carry on the electing process. The other ones become passive.
If all identities are in [1, n], then the communicated bit-positions are less than dlog ne,
and thus can be represented with O(log log n) bits. The difficulty is to implement this simple
“compact” leader election mechanism in a self-stabilizing manner. In particular, the nodes
may not have same number of bits encoding their identifiers, the ring may not start from a
configuration where every node is a candidate leader, and the distributed scheduler may lead
nodes to operate at various paces.
An additional problem in self-stabilizing leader election is the potential presence of impostor
leaders. If one can store the identity of the leader at each node, then detecting an impostor is
easy. Under our memory constraints, nodes cannot store the identity of the leader, nor read
entirely their own identifier. So, detecting impostor leaders becomes non trivial, notably when
an impostor has an identity whose most significant bit is equal to the most significant bit of the
leader. To overcome this problem, the selection of the leader must run perpetually, leading our
algorithm to be non-silent.
3.1.2 Spanning tree construction
Our approach to make the above scheme self-stabilizing is to merge the leader election process
with a tree construction process. Every candidate leader is the root of a tree. Whenever a
candidate leader becomes passive, its tree is merged to another tree, until there remains only
one tree. The main obstacle in self-stabilizing tree-construction is to handle an arbitrary initial
configuration. This is particularly difficult if the initial configuration yields a cycle rather than
a spanning forest. In this case, when the leader election subroutine, and the tree construction
subroutine are conjointly used, the presence of the cycle implies that, while every node is
expecting to point to a neighbor leading to a leader, there are no leaders in the network. Such
a configuration is called fake leader. In order to break cycles that can be present in the initial
configuration, we use an improved variant of the classical distance calculation [19]. In the
classical approach, every node u maintains an integer variable du that stores the distance from
u to the root of its tree. If v denotes the parent of u, then typically dv = du − 1, and if
dv ≥ du, then u deletes its pointer to v. If the topology of the network is a ring, then detecting
the presence of an initial spanning cycle, instead of a spanning forest, may involve distance
variables as large as n, inducing Ω(logn) bits of memory.
In order to use exponentially less memory, our algorithm uses the distance technique but
modulo log n. More specifically, each node v maintains three variables. The first variable is an
integer denoted by dv ∈ {0, ..., blog nc}, called the “distance” of node v. Only candidate leaders
v can have dv = 0. Each node v maintains dv = 1 + (min{du, du′} mod blog nc) where u and
u′ are the neighbors of v in the ring. Note that nodes are not aware of n. Thus they do not
actually use the value blog nc as above, but a potentially erroneous estimation of it.
The second variable is pv, denoting the parent of node v. This parent is its neighbor w
such that dv = 1 + (dw mod blog nc). By itself, this technique is not sufficient to detect the
presence of a cycle, because the number of nodes can be a multiple of blog nc. Therefore, we
also introduce the notion of hyper-node, defined as follows:
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Definition 1 A hyper-node X is a set {x1, x2, · · · , xblognc} of consecutive nodes in the ring,
such that dx1 = 1, dx2 = 2,..., dxblognc = blog nc, px2 = x1, px3 = x2, ..., pxblognc = xblognc−1 and
px1 6= x2.
The parent of a hyper-nodeX = {x1, x2, · · · , xblognc} is a hyper-node Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yblognc}
such that px1 = yblognc. By definition, there are at most dn/blog nce hyper-nodes. If n is not
divisible by blog nc, then some nodes can be elements of an incomplete hyper-node. There can
be several incomplete hyper-nodes, but if the parent of a (complete) hyper-node is an incomplete
hyper-node, then an error is detected. Incomplete hyper-nodes must be leaves: there cannot be
incomplete hyper-nodes in a cycle.
The key to our protocol is that hyper-nodes can maintain larger distance information than
simple nodes, by distributing the information among the nodes of a hyper-node. More pre-
cisely, we assume that each node v maintains a bit of information, stored in variable dBv.
Let X = {x1, x2, · · · , xblognc} be a hyper-node, the set dBX = {dBx1 , dBx2 , · · · , dBxblognc} can
be considered as the binary representation of an integer on blog nc bits, i.e., between 0 and
2blognc − 1. Now, it is possible to use the same distance approach as usual, but at the hyper-
node level. Part of our protocol consists in comparing, for two hyper-nodes X and Y , the
distance dBX and the distance dBY . If Y is the parent of X, then the difference between dBX
and dBY must be one. Otherwise an inconsistency is detected regarding the current spanning
forest. The fact that hyper-nodes include blog nc nodes implies that dealing with distances
between hyper-nodes is sufficient to detect the presence of a cycle spanning the n-node ring.
This is because 2blognc ≥ n/ log n. (Note that hyper-nodes with k nodes such that 2k ≥ n/k
would do the same).
In essence, the part of our algorithm dedicated to checking the absence of a spanning cy-
cle generated by the parenthood relation boils down to comparing distances between hyper-
nodes. Note that comparing distances between hyper-node involves communication at distance
Ω(log n). This is another reason why our algorithm is non-silent.
3.2 Detailed description
3.2.1 Notations and preliminaries
Let Cn = (V,E) be the n-node ring, where V is the set of nodes, and E the set of edges. A
node v has access to an unique identifier, but can only access to this identifier one bit at a time,
using the Bit(x, v) function, that returns the position of the xth most significant bit equal to 1
in Idv. This position can be encoded with O(log log n) bits when identifiers are encoded using
O(log n) bits, as we assume they are. A node v has access to local port number associated to
its adjacent edges. The variable parent of node v, denoted by pv, is actually the port number
of the edge connecting v to its parent. In case of n-node rings, pv ∈ {0, 1} for every v. (We
do not assume any consistency between the port numbers). In a legitimate configuration, the
structure induced by the parenthood relation must be a tree. The presence of more than one
tree, or of a cycle, correspond to illegitimate configurations. We denote by Nv the set of the
neighbors of v in Cn, for any node v ∈ V .
The variable distance, denoted by dv at node v, takes values in {−1, 0, 1, ..., blog nc}. We
have dv = −1 if all the variables of v are reset. We have dv = 0 if the node v is a root of some
tree induced by the parenthood relation. Such a root is also called candidate leader. Finally,
dv ∈ {1, ..., blog nc} if v is a node of some tree induced by the parenthood relation, different from
the root. Such a node is also called passive. Note that we only assume that variable d can hold
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RError : T.Er(v) ∨ T.Reset(v) → Reset(v);
RStart : ¬T.Er(v) ∧ ¬T.Reset(v) ∧ (dv = -1) ∧ T.Start(v) → Start(v);
RPassive : ¬T.Er(v) ∧ ¬T.Reset(v) ∧ (dv > -1) ∧ T.Pass(v) → Passive(v);
RRoot : ¬T.Er(v) ∧ ¬T.Reset(v) ∧ (dv = 0) ∧ T.Pass(v) ∧ T.StartdB(v) → StartdB(v);
¬T.Er(v) ∧ ¬T.Reset(v) ∧ (dv = 0) ∧ ¬T.Pass(v) ∧ T.Inc(v) → Inc(v);
RUpdate : ¬T.Er(v) ∧ ¬T.Reset(v) ∧ (dv > 0) ∧ ¬T.Pass(v) ∧ ¬EqElecP(v) ∧ T.Update(v) → Update(v);
RHyperNd : ¬T.Er(v) ∧ ¬T.Reset(v) ∧ (dv > 0) ∧ ¬T.Pass(v) ∧ EqElecP(v)∧
(Addv = ∅) ∧ T.Add(v) → BinAdd(v);
(Addv 6= ∅) ∧ T.Broad(v) → Broad(v);
T.Verif(v) → Verif(v);
T.CleanM(v) → CleanM(v);
Figure 1: Formal description of algorithm CLE.
at least (and not exactly) blog nc + 1 different values, since nodes are not aware of how many
they are in the ring, and just use an estimation of n. The children of a node v are returned by
the macro Ch(v), which returns the port number(s) of the edges leading to the child(ren) of v.
To detect cycles, we use four variables. First, each node maintains the variable dB introduced
in the previous section, for constructing a distributed integer stored on an hyper-node. The
second variable, Addv ∈ {+, ok, ∅}, is used for performing additions involving values stored
distributively on hyper-nodes. The third variable, PLv (for pipeline), is used to send the result
of an addition to the hyper-node children of the hyper-node containing v. Finally, the fourth
variable, HCv (for Hyper-node Checking), is dedicated to checking the hyper-node bits. Variables
PLv and HCv are either empty, or each composed of a pair of variables (x, y) ∈ {1, ..., blog nc}×
{0, 1}.
For constructing the tree rooted at the node with highest identity, we use three additional
variables. After convergence, we expect the leader to be the unique node with distance zero,
and to be the root of an inward directed spanning tree of the ring, where the arc of the tree is
defined by the parenthood relation. To satisfy the leader election specifications, we introduce
the variable leaderv ∈ {0, 1} whose value is 1 if v is the leader and 0 otherwise. Since we do
not assume that the identifiers of every node are encoded on the same number of bits, simply
comparing the i-th most significant bit of two nodes is irrelevant. So, we use variable B̂, which
represents the most significant bit-position of all the identities present in the ring. This variable
is also locally used at each node v as an estimate of blog nc. Only the nodes v whose variable
B̂v is equal to the most significant bit of the Idv carry on participating to the election. Finally,
the variables Bit-Strong, Phase, Bit-Position and Control are the core of the election process. Let
r be the root of the tree including node v. Then, the variable Bit-Strongv stores the position
of the most significant bit of Idr, variable Phasev stores the current phase number i, variable
Bit-Position stores the bit-position of Idr at phase i, and variable Controlv stores a boolean
dedicated to the control of the updating of the elections variables.
3.2.2 The Compact Leader Election algorithm CLE
Algorithm CLE is presented in Figure 1. In this figure, a rule of the form
label : guard0 ∧ (guard1 ∨ guard2) −→ (command1; command2)
where commandi is performed when guard0∧ guardi is true. Such a rule is presented in several
lines, one for the common guard, guard0, and one for each alternative guards, guardi, with
their respective command. Figure 1 describes the rules of the algorithm.
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CLE is composed of six rules:
− The rule RError, detects at node v the presence of inconsistencies between the content of
its variables and the content of its neighboring variables. If v has not reset its variables,
or has not restarted, the command Reset(v) is activated, i.e., all the content of all the
variables at node v are reset, and the variable dv is set to −1.
− The rule RStart, makes sure that, if an inconsistency is detected at some node, then all
the nodes of the network reset their variables, and restart. Before restarting, every node v
waits until all its neighbors are reset or have restarted. A node v that restarts sets dv = 0,
and its election variables Bit-Strongv, Bit-Positionv appropriately, with Phasev = 1.
− The rule RPassive, is dedicated to the election process. A node v uses command Passive(v)
when one of its neighbors has a bit-position larger than its bit-position, at the same phase.
− The rule RRoot, concerns the candidate leaders, i.e., every node v with dv = 0. Such a node
can only execute the rule RRoot, resulting in that node performing one of the following two
commands. Command StartdB(v) results in v distributing the bit dB to its neighboring
hyper-nodes. Command Inc(v) results in node v increasing its phase by 1. This happens
when all the nodes between v and others candidate leaders in the current tree are in the
same phase, with the same election values Bit-Strongv,Bit-Positionv,Controlv.
− The rule RUpdate, is dedicated to updating the election variables.
− The rule RHyperNd, is dedicated to the hyper-nodes distance verification.
3.2.3 Hyper-nodes distance verification
Let us consider two hyper-nodes X and Y with X the parent of Y . Our technique for verifying
the distance between the two hyper-nodes X and Y , is the following (see an example on Fig-
ure 2). X initiates the verification. For this purpose, X dedicates two local variables at each of
its nodes: Add (to perform the addition) and PL (to broadcast the result of this addition inside
X). Similarly, Y uses the variable HC for receiving the result of the addition.
The binary addition starts at the node holding the last bit of X, that is node xk with k = B̂v.
Node xk sets Addxk := +. Then, every node in X, but xk, proceeds as follows. For k
′ < k, if
the child xk′′ of xk′ has Addxk′′ = + and dBxk′′ = 1, then x
′
k assigns + to Addxk′′ . Otherwise,
if Addxk′′ = + and dBxk′′ = 0, the binary addition at this point does not generate a carry, and
thus xk′ assigns “ok” to Addxk′ . Since Addxk′ = ok, the binary addition is considered finished,
and xk′ ’s ancestors (parent, grand-parent, etc.) in the hyper-node assign “ok” to their variable
Add. However, if the first bit of X (that is, dBx1) is equal to one, then the algorithm detects
an error because the addition would yield to an overflow. The result of the hyper-node binary
addition is the following: if a node xk has Addxk = ok, then it means that node yk holds the
appropriate bit corresponding to the correct result of the addition if and only if dByk = dBxk .
Otherwise, if Addxk = +, then the bit at yk is correct if and only if dByk = dBxk
2.
The binary addition in X is completed when node x1 satisfies Addx1 = + or Addx1 = ok.
In that case, x1 starts broadcasting the result of the addition. For this purpose, it sets
PLx1 = (1, dBy1) where dBy1 is obtained from Addx1 and dBx1 . Each node xi in X, i > 1,
then successively perform the same operation as x1. While doing so, node xi sets Addxi = ⊥,
in order to enable the next verification. When the child of a node xi publishes (dxi , dBxi), node
xi deletes PLxi , in order to, again, enable the next verification. From i = 1, . . . , k, all variables
PLxi in X are deleted. When yi sets HCyi [0] = dyi, node yi can check whether the bit in HCyi [1]
corresponds to dByi . If yes, then the verification carries on. Otherwise yi detects a fault.
2If dBx = 0 then dBx = 1, and if dBx = 1 then dBx = 0.
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(a)
X Y
d dB Add HCPL d dB Add HCPL d dB Add HCPL d dB Add HCPL d dB Add HCPL d dB Add HCPL d dB Add HCPL d dB Add HCPL
(b) 1 1 2 0 3 0 4 1 + 1 1 2 0 3 1 4 1
(c) 1 1 ok 2 0 ok 3 0 + 4 1 + 1 1 2 0 3 1 4 1
(d) 1 1 ok 1,1 2 0 ok 3 0 + 4 1 + 1 1 2 0 3 1 4 1
(e) 1 1 ok 1,1 2 0 ok 1,1 3 0 + 4 1 + 1 1 2 0 3 1 4 1
(f) 1 1 2 0 ok 2,0 3 0 + 1,1 4 1 + 1 1 2 0 3 1 4 1
(g) 1 1 2 0 3 0 + 2,0 4 1 + 1,1 1 1 2 0 3 1 4 1
(h) 1 1 2 0 3 0 + 3,1 4 1 + 2,0 1 1 1,1 2 0 3 1 4 1
(i) 1 1 2 0 3 0 4 1 + 3,1 1 1 2,0 2 0 3 1 4 1
(j) 1 1 2 0 3 0 4 1 + 4,0 1 1 3,1 2 0 2,0 3 1 4 1
(k) 1 1 2 0 3 0 4 1 1 1 4,0 2 0 3,1 3 1 4 1
(l) 1 1 2 0 3 0 4 1 1 1 2 0 4,0 3 1 3,1 4 1
(m) 1 1 2 0 3 0 4 1 1 1 2 0 3 1 4,0 4 1
(n) 1 1 2 0 3 0 4 1 1 1 2 0 3 1 4 1 4,0
Figure 2: An example of distance verification between the hyper-node X and its child Y . In this example,
hyper-nodes are composed of four nodes. (a) The memory of each node is represented by three boxes storing,
respectively, the distance of the node to the root, the bit-distance of the hyper-node the node belongs to, the
binary addition information, plus two boxes containing information for the bit verification. (Empty boxes contains
⊥). (b) The last node of X starts the addition. (c) The addition in X is completed. (d) The first node of X
starts the verification. (e-g) The result of the addition is pipelined. (h) The first node v of Y checks dBv. (j)
The second node v′ of Y checks dBv′ . (l) The third node v
′′ of Y checks dBv′′ . (n) The last node of Y detects
an error.
3.2.4 Leader election and tree construction
As previously mentioned, our leader election protocol simultaneously performs, together with
the election of a leader, the construction a tree rooted at the leader. The leader should be
the node whose identifier is maximal among all nodes in the ring. Our assumptions regarding
identifiers are very weak. In particular, identifiers may be of various sizes, and the total number
n of different identifiers is not known to the nodes. In our algorithm, we use the variable B̂
to estimate (to some extent) the logarithm of the network size, and the variable Bit-Strongv
to propagate this estimation in the ring. More precisely, B̂ represents the most significant bit-
position among all identities present in the ring, and we consider that all the nodes that do
not carry the right value of B̂ in their local variables are not consistent. During the execution
of the algorithm, only nodes whose identifiers match the most significant bit-position remain
candidate leaders. Moreover, only candidate leaders broadcast bit-position during subsequent
phases.
Let us now detail the usage of the variables used for the election. For the sake of simplifi-
cation, we introduce the variable Elec. The variable Elec is equal to a 4-tuple:
Elecv = (Bit-Strongv,Phasev,Bit-Positionv,Controlv)
This variable is essentially meant to represent the current bit-position of the candidate leaders.
Bit-Strongv represents the most significant bit-position among all identifiers, which must be in
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agreement with variable B̂v to assess the validity of Elecv. The variables Phasev and Bit-Positionv
of Elecv are the current phase i, and the corresponding bit-position revealed by a candidate
leader during phase i, respectively. The comparison of bits-positions is relevant only if these
bits-positions are revealed at the same phase. Hence, we force the system to proceed in phases.
If, at phase i, the bit-position ρv of node v is smaller than the bit-position ρu of a neighboring
node u, then node v becomes passive, and v takes u as parent. It is simple to compare two
candidate leaders when these candidate leaders are neighbors. Yet, along with the execution of
the algorithm, some nodes become passive, and therefore the remaining candidate leaders can
be far away, separated by passive nodes. Each passive node is with a positive distance variable
d, and is in a subtree rooted at some candidate leader. Let us now consider one such subtree
Tv rooted at a candidate leader v. Whenever v increases its phase from i to i+ 1, and sets the
bit-position related to phase i + 1, all nodes u in Tv must update their variable Elecu in order
to have the same value as Elecv.
At each phase, trees are merged into larger trees. At the end of phase i, all the nodes in
a given tree have the same bit-position, and the leaves of the tree inform their parent that
the phase is finished. The local variable Control, called control, is dedicated to this purpose.
Each leaf assigns 1 to its control variable, and a bottom-up propagation of this control variable
eventually reaches the root. In this way, the root learns that the current phase is finished. If
the largest identifiers are encoded using log n bits, each phase results in halving the number
of trees, and therefore of candidate leaders. So within at most log n phases, a single leader
remains. To avoid electing an impostor leader, the (unique) leader restarts the election at the
first phase. This is repeated forever. If an arbitrary initial configuration induces an impostor
leader `, either ` has not the most significant bit-position in its identifier or this impostor leader
has its most significant bit-position equal to the most significant bit-position of the (real) leader.
In the former case, the error is detected by a node with the most significant bit-position. In the
latter case, error is detected by at least one node (the true leader), because there exists at least
one phase i where the bit-position of the leader is superior to the bit-position of the impostor.
The process of leader election and spanning tree construction is slowed down by the hyper-
node construction and management. When a node v changes its parents, it also changes its
variable dBv, in order not to impact the current construction of the tree. The point is that
variable dBv should be handled with extra care to remain coherent with the tree resulting from
merging different trees. To handle this, every candidate leader assigns bits for its children into
its variable PL. More precisely, if a root v has not children, then v publishes the bit for its
future children with variable distance equal to one. If root v has children with distance variable
equal to one, then v publishes the bit for the children u with du = 2, and so on, until the
distance variable of v becomes B̂v. On the other hand, a node cannot change its parent if its
future new parent does not publish the bit corresponding to its future distance variable. When
the hyper-node adjacent to the root is constructed, the hyper-node verification process takes
care of the assignment of the bits to the node inside the hyper-node.
3.3 Formal description of our algorithm CLE
In the definitions below, the notation b ≡ P is used to define the boolean b, which is true if and
only if the predicate P is true.
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3.3.1 Computing the set of children:
EqB̂(v) = {u ∈ Nv | B̂u = B̂v ∧ Bit-Strongu = Bit-Strongv}
EqElec(v,X) = {u ∈ X | Elecu = Elecv}
EqElecP(v) ≡ Elecv = Elecpv
InfPh(v) = {u ∈ EqB̂(v) | (Phaseu = Phasev − 1) ∨ ((Phasev = 1) ∧ (Phaseu = B̂v))}
CandC(v) = EqElec(v, EqB̂(v)) ∪ InfPh(v)
Ch(v) = {u ∈ CandC(v) | ((dv < B̂v) ∧ (du = dv + 1)) ∨ (dv ∈ {0, B̂v} ∧ (du = 1))}
3.3.2 Hyper-nodes distance verification
VCh(v,M, T ) ≡ {u ∈ Ch(v) |M = T} = Ch(v)
AddNd(v) ≡ (Addv = ⊥) ∧ (PLv = ⊥) ∧ (Ch(v) 6= ∅) .
Addp(v) ≡
(
(dv > 1) ∧ (Addpv = ⊥)
) ∨ (dv = 1)
AddCh(v) ≡
(
(dv < B̂v) ∧ VCh(v,PL,⊥)
) ∨ ((dv = B̂v) ∧ VCh(v,HC,⊥))
Add+(v) ≡ (dv = B̂v) ∨ (VCh(v,Add,+) ∧ VCh(v, dB, 1))
Addok(v) ≡ VCh(v,Add, ok) ∨
(
VCh(v,Add,+) ∧ VCh(v, dB, 0))
T.Add(v) ≡ AddNd(v) ∧ Addp(v) ∧ AddCh(v) ∧
(
Add+(v) ∨ Addok(v)
)
MCh(v, k) ≡ ((dv < B̂v) ∧ VCh(v,PL, k)) ∨ ((dv = B̂v) ∧ VCh(v,HC, k))
BroaddB(v) ≡ [(dv = 1) ∧ (PLv = ⊥)] ∨ [(dv > 1) ∧ (PLv[0] = dv-1) ∧ MCh(v,PLv)]
Broadp1(v) ≡ (PLv = ⊥) ∧ (PLpv [0] = 1) ∧ MCh(v, ∅)
Broadpg(v) ≡ PLv ∧ MCh(v,PLv) ∧ (PLpv [0] = PLv[0] + 1) ∧ (PLv[0] 6= dv-1)
Broadp(v) ≡ (dv > 1) ∧ (Broadp1(v) ∨ Broadpg(v))
T.Broad(v) ≡ (Ch(v) 6= ∅) ∧ (BroaddB(v) ∨ Broadp(v))
VrfLast(v,M) ≡ ¬Ch(v) ∧ (Mpv [0] = dv + 1)
VrfStart(v,M) ≡ Ch(v) ∧ (Mpv [0] = dv + 1) ∧ VCh(v,HC, ∅)
VrfBroad(v,M) ≡ Ch(v) ∧ (Mpv [0] > dv) ∧ VCh(v,HC,HCv)
Vrf(v,M) ≡ (VrfLast(v,M) ∨ VrfStart(v,M) ∨ VrfBroad(v,M))
Vrf1(v) ≡ (dv = 1) ∧ (PLpv [0] = HCv[0] + 1) ∧ Vrf(v,PL)
Vrfg(v) ≡ (dv > 1) ∧ (HCpv [0] = HCv[0] + 1) ∧ (Elecpv = Elecv) ∧ Vrf(v,HC)
Vrf1g(v) ≡
(
(dv = 1) ∧ (PLpv [0] = 1)
) ∨ ((dv > 1) ∧ (HCpv [0] = dv))
T.Verif(v) ≡ [(HCv = ∅) ∧ Vrf1g(v)] ∨ [(HCv 6= ∅) ∧ (Vrf1(v) ∨ Vrfg(v))]
EqElecN(v,X) ≡ {u ∈ X | (Elecu = Elecv)} = Nv
CleanMV1A(v) ≡ EqElecN(v, EqB̂(v)) ∧ (HCv[0] = B̂v) ∧ [dv = B̂v ∨ (dv 6= B̂v ∧ VCh(v,HC, (-1, -1)))]
CleanMV1B(v) ≡ EqElecN(v, EqB̂(v)) ∧ HCv = (B̂v, 0) ∧ [dv = B̂v ∨ (dv 6= B̂v ∧ VCh(v,HC,⊥))]
VHC(v) ≡ HCv = (-1, -1) ∧ HCpv = (-1, -1)
CleanMVA(v) ≡ VHC(v) ∧ [(dv < B̂v ∧ VCh(v,HC, ∅)) ∨ (dv = B̂v ∧ VCh(v,PL,⊥))]
CleanMVB(v) ≡ HCv = (-1, -1) ∧ (dv = 1) ∧ VCh(v,HC,⊥)
CleanMVD(v) ≡ (dv < B̂v) ∧ (Ch(v) 6= ∅) ∧ VCh(v,HC,⊥)
CleanMVC(v) ≡ (HC[0] = B̂v) ∧
((
(dv = B̂v) ∧ (Ch(v) = ∅)
) ∨ CleanMVD(v))
CleanMC(v) ≡ (PLv[0] = dv) ∧ MCh(v,PLv) ∧ (((PLpv = ⊥) ∧ (dv > 1)) ∨ (dv = 1))
T.CleanM(v) ≡ CleanMV1A(v) ∨ CleanMV1B(v) ∨ CleanMVA(v) ∨ CleanMVB(v) ∨ CleanMC(v)
Root(v) ≡ (leaderv = 1) ∧ (dv = 0) ∧ (pv = ∅) ∧ (B̂v = Bit(1, Idv))
T.StartdB(v) ≡ Root(v) ∧ (Ch(v) 6= ∅) ∧ VCh(v,HC,PLv)
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3.3.3 Leader election and tree construction
MaxB̂(v) = max{Bit-Strongu | u ∈ Nv}
NeigMaxB̂(v) = {u ∈ Nv | Bit-Strongu = MaxB̂(v)}
EqPh(v,X) = {u ∈ X | (Phaseu = Phasev)}
MaxEqP(v) = max{Bit-Positionu | u ∈ EqPh(v,Nv) ∧ Bit-Positionu > Bit-Positionv}
NeigMaxEqP(v) = {u ∈ MaxEqP(v) | Bit-Positionu = MaxEqP(v)}
Best(v) =
{
min{portu | u ∈ NeigMaxB̂(v)} if MaxB̂(v) > B̂v
min{portu | u ∈ NeigMaxEqP(v)} otherwise
Pass0(v, x) ≡
(
(dx = 0) ∧ (PLx = (1, 0))
)
PassdB(v, x) ≡ Pass0(v, x) ∨
(
(0 < dx < B̂x) ∧ (HCx[0] = dx + 1)
) ∨ ((dx = B̂x) ∧ (PLx[0] = 1))
EqMEi(i,X) = {i ∈ {0, ..., i} : Elecu[i] = Elecv[i] | u ∈ X}
EqMEx(i, x,X) = {Elecu[i] = x | u ∈ X}
WaveB(v) ≡
(
EqMEi(2, Ch(v)) = Ch(v) ∧ EqMEx(3, 1, Ch(v)) = Ch(v)) ∨ ¬Ch(v)
T.Pass(v) ≡ Best(v) ∧ PassdB(v, Best(v)) ∧ WaveB(v)
SupPh(v) = {u ∈ EqB̂(v) | (Phaseu = Phasev + 1) ∨ (Phasev = B̂v ∧ Phaseu = 1))}
Other(v) = {u ∈ Nv − Ch(v)− SupPh(v) | Elecv = Elecu}
T.Inc(v) ≡ Root(v) ∧ WaveB(v) ∧ (Ch(v) ∪ SupPh(v) ∪ Other(v) = Nv)
Cohp(v) ≡ (Best(v) = ∅) ∧ (pv ∈ Nv) ∧ (B̂v = B̂pv ) ∧ (dv = dpv − 1)
Upp(v) ≡ (Controlpv = 0) ∧
(
(Phasepv = Phasev + 1) ∨ ((Phasev = B̂v) ∧ (Phasepv = 1))
)
UpE(v) ≡ (Controlv = 0) ∧ (Controlpv = 0)
UpBack(v) ≡ UpE(v) ∧ (EqMEi(v, 2,Nv) = Nv) ∧ (EqMEx(2, Ch(v), 1) = Ch(v))
T.Update(v) ≡ Cohp(v) ∧ (Upp(v) ∧ WaveB(v)) ∨ UpBack(v)
3.3.4 Reset and Error detection
MReset(v) ≡ (dBv = 0) ∧ (Addv = ⊥) ∧ (HCv = ⊥)
VReset(v) ≡ (leaderv = 0) ∧ (dv = -1) ∧ (B̂v = -1) ∧ (Elecv = (-1, 0, -1, -1))
NdReset(v) ≡ MReset(v) ∧ (PLv = ⊥) ∧ VReset(v)
NdStart(v) ≡ MReset(v) ∧ (PLv 6= ⊥) ∧ Root(v) ∧ (Elecv = (Bit(1, Idv), 1,Bit(1, Idv), {0, 1}))
NgReset(v) = {u ∈ Nv | NdReset(u)}
NgStart(v) = {u ∈ Nv | NdStart(u)}
T.Reset(v) ≡ ¬NdReset(v) ∧ ¬NdStart(v) ∧ |NgReset(v)| > 0
T.Start(v) ≡ NdReset(v) ∧ ({NgReset(v) ∪ NgStart(v)} = Nv)
PassNd(v) ≡ (leaderv = 0) ∧ (dv > 0) ∧ Cohp(v) ∧ (B̂v ≥ Bit(1, Idv)) ∧ (Bit-Strongv = B̂v)
Erd(v) ≡ (dv > 0) ∧ ∧(Best(v) = ∅)¬
(
(dpv < B̂v ∧ dv 6= dpv + 1) ∨ (dpv ∈ {0, B̂v} ∧ dv 6= 1)
)
ErNd(v) ≡ (¬Root(v) ∧ ¬PassNd(v) ∧ ¬NdReset(v)) ∨ (PassNd(v) ∧ Erd(v))
NgPh(v) = {Phaseu | u ∈ Nv}
ErPhMinB(v) ≡
(
(Phasev = B̂v) ∧ (min{NgPh(v)} 6∈ {1, B̂v-1, B̂v})
)
)
ErPhMinG(v) ≡
(
(Phasev 6= B̂v) ∧ (Phasev −min{NgPh(v)} > 1)
)
ErPhMax1(v) ≡
(
(Phasev = 1) ∧ (max{NgPh(v)} 6∈ {2, B̂v})
)
ErPhMaxG(v) ≡
(
(Phasev 6= 1) ∧ (max{NgPh(v)} − Phasev > 1)
)
ErPhase(v) ≡
(
ErPhMinB(v) ∨ ErPhMinG(v) ∨ ErPhMax1(v) ∨ ErPhMaxG(v)
)
ErBp(v) ≡ (dv > 0) ∧ {{u ∈ EqPh(v, EqB̂(v)) | Bit-Positionu = Bit-Positionv} ∪ SupPh(v) ∪ {Best(v)}} = ∅
ErControl(v) ≡ ((Controlv = 1) ∧ ¬WaveB(v)) ∨ ((Controlv = 0) ∧ (Controlpv = 1))
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ErMRoot(v) ≡ (dv = 0) ∧
(
(Addv 6= ⊥) ∨ (HCv 6= ⊥)
)
ErMAdd(v) ≡ (0 < dv < B̂v) ∧ (Addv 6= ⊥) ∧ VCh(v,Add,⊥) .
ErPL(v) ≡ (dv > 1) ∧
(
(PLv[0] > dv) ∨ ((Best(v) = ∅) ∧ (PLpv = ⊥) ∧ (PLv[0] < dpv )
)
ErHCch(v) ≡ (dv < B̂v) ∧ (HCv = ⊥) ∧ VCh(v,HC,¬⊥)
ErHCp(v) ≡ (dv > 0) ∧ (HCv 6= ⊥) ∧ (Best(v) = ∅) ∧ (HCpv [0] < HCv[0])
ErHC(v) ≡ (0 < dv < B̂v) ∧
(
(HCv[0] < dv) ∨ ErHCch(v) ∨ ErHCp(v)
)
ErMem(v) ≡ ErMRoot(v) ∨ ErMAdd(v) ∨ ErPL(v) ∨ ErHC(v)
ErT(v) ≡ (NgReset(v) = ∅) ∧
(
ErNd(v) ∨ ErPhase(v) ∨ ErBp(v) ∨ ErControl(v) ∨ ErMem(v)
)
ErAdd(v) ≡ (dv = 1) ∧ (dB = 1) ∧ VCh(v,Add,+) ∧ VCh(v, dB, 1)
ErH1(v) ≡ (dv = 1) ∧ (PLpv [0] = dv) ∧ (PLpv [1] 6= dBv)
ErHg(v) ≡ (dv > 1) ∧ (HCpv [0] = dv) ∧ (HCpv [1] 6= dBv)
ErHyper(v) ≡ ErAdd(v) ∨
(
(Elecv = Elecpv ) ∧ (ErH1(v) ∨ ErHg(v))
)
ErElec(v) ≡ (dv = 0) ∧ (B̂v = Bit(1, Idv)) ∧ (Bit-Positionv < Bit(Phasev, Idv))
T.Er(v) ≡ ErT(v) ∨ ErHyper(v) ∨ ErElec(v)
3.3.5 Commands
Commands for hyper-node distance verification:
Verif(v):
(dv = 1) ∧ (Vpd(v) ∨ Vp1(v))→ HCv = PLpv
(dv > 1) ∧ (Vpd(v) ∨ Vp1¯(v))→ HCv = HCpv
CleanM(v):
CleanMV1A(v) ∨ CleanMV1B(v)→ HCv = (-1, -1)
CleanMVA(v) ∨ CleanMVB(v)→ HCv = ⊥
CleanMC(v)→ PLv = ⊥
BinAdd(v):
Add+(v)→ Addv = +
Addok(v)→ Addv = ok
Broad(v):
BroaddB(v) ∧ (Addv = ok)→
PLv = (dv, dBv);Addv = ⊥
BroaddB(v) ∧ (Addv = +)→
PLv = (dv, dBv);Addv = ⊥
Broadp(v)→ PLv = PLpv
Commands for the leader election and tree construction:
Inc(v) :
T ≡ (Bit-Positionv = -1) ∧ (Phasev = B̂v + 1)
T → i := 1; ¬T → i := Phasev + 1;
Elecv := (Bit(1, v), i,Bit(i, v), 0);
StartdB(v):
(PLv[0] = B̂v)→ PLv := (1, 0)
(PLv[0] < B̂v)→ PLv := (PLv[0] + 1, 0)
Update(v):
WaveB(v) ∧ Upp(v)→ Elecv = Elecpv
UpBack(v)→ Controlv = 1
Passive(v) :
leaderv := 0; pv := Best(v); dBv := HCpv [0];
(dpv = B̂pv )→ dv := 1
(dpv < B̂pv )→ dv := dpv + 1
B̂v := B̂pv ; Elecv := Elecpv
Addv := ⊥; HCv := ⊥; PLv := ⊥;
Commands activated after error detection:
Reset(v) :
leaderv := 0; pv := ∅; dv := -1; dBv := 0;
B̂v := -1; Elecv := (-1, 0, -1, -1);
Addv := ⊥; HCv := ⊥; PLv := ⊥;
Start(v) :
leaderv := 1; dv := 0;
B̂v = Bit(1, v); Elecv = (Bit(1, v), 1,Bit(1, v), 0);
PLv = (1, 0);
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4 Correctness
In this section, we formally prove the correctness of our Algorithm.
Theorem 1 Algorithm CLE solves the leader election problem in a self-stabilizing manner for
the n-node ring, in the state model, with a distributed weakly-fair scheduler. Moreover, if the n
node identities are in the range [1, nc] for some c ≥ 1, then Algorithm CLE uses O(log log n)
bits of memory per node, and stabilizes in O(n log2 n) rounds.
The main difficulty for proving this theorem is to prove that CLE can detect any cycle
generated by the parenthood relation in the initial configuration, and can, whenever a cycle is
detected, remove this cycle. Let Γ be the set of all possible configurations of the ring, under the
set of variables described before in the paper. First, we prove that Algorithm CLE detects the
presence of “trivial” errors, that is, inconsistencies between neighbors. Second, we prove that,
after correcting all the trivial errors (possibly using a reset), CLE converges and maintains
configurations free of trivial errors. The set of configurations free of trivial errors is denoted by
ΓTEF where TEF stands for “Trivial Error Free”. From now on, we assume only configurations
from ΓTEF.
The core of the proof regarding proper cycle detection is based on proving the correctness
of the hyper-node distance verification process. This verification process is the most technical
part of the algorithm, and proving its correctness is actually the main challenge in the way of
establishing Theorem 1. This is achieved by using proofs based on invariance arguments.
Once the correctness of the hyper-node distance verification process has been proved, we
establish the convergence of Algorithm CLE from an arbitrary configuration in ΓTEF to a config-
uration without cycles, and where all hyper-node distances are correct. The set of configurations
without cycles is denoted by ΓCF (where CF stands for “Cycle Free”). We prove that a con-
figuration is in ΓCF if and only if all hyper-node distances are correct. Once we can restrict
ourselves to configurations in ΓCF, we prove the correctness of our mechanisms detecting and
removing impostor leaders. We denote by ΓIEF (where IEF stands for “Impostor leader Error
Free”) the set of configurations with no impostors. Finally, assuming a configuration in ΓIEF,
we prove that the system reaches and maintains a configuration with exactly one leader, equal
to the node with maximum identity. Moreover, we prove that the structure induced by the
parenthood relation is a tree rooted at the leader, and spanning all nodes. We denote by ΓLE
the set of configurations where the unique leader is the node with maximum identity. In other
words, we prove that CLE is self-stabilizing for ΓLE.
In the statements of the lemmas below, we define predicates on configurations, these predi-
cates are used as attractors toward a legitimate configuration (i.e., a configuration with unique
leader). To establish convergence toward attractors, we use potential functions [32], that is,
functions that map configurations to non-negative integers, and that strictly decrease after each
algorithm command is executed.
Before starting the proofs, let us first define the Predicate ΓLE (Leader Election) that serves
as the definition for legitimate configurations. Let L : Γ→ N be the function defined by
L(γ) =
∑
v∈V
leaderv .
A configuration γ is legitimate for the leader election specification, i.e., satisfies ΓLE, if and only
if L(γ) = 1. That is,
ΓLE = {γ ∈ Γ : L(γ) = 1}.
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Now, for the purpose of the proof, let us define Predicate ΓTEF (Trivial Error Free). Let ψ :
Γ× V → N be the function defined by:
ψ(γ, v) =
{
1 if ErT(v) is true
0 otherwise
Let Ψ : Γ→ N be the function defined by:
Ψ(γ) =
∑
v∈V
ψ(γ, v) .
Note that all nodes are legitimate with respect to ErT(v) if and only if Ψ(γ) = 0. We define
ΓTEF = {γ ∈ Γ : Ψ(γ) = 0}.
Lemma 1 true . ΓTEF in one round.
Proof. The predicate ErT(v) is composed of two types of sub-predicates: the ones independent
of the local variables of the neighbors, called independent sub-predicates, and the ones based
on comparisons with the local variables of the neighbors, called dependent sub-predicates. (See
predicate in 3.3.4). The independent sub-predicates are Root, PassNd, and ErMRoot. All other
sub-predicates of ErT are dependents. If an independent sub-predicate is true, then ErT(v) is
true, and the execution of any command by a neighbor of v has no influence on the predicate
ErT(v), which remains true. (Note that if an independent sub-predicate of v is true, then v
may have all its neighbors w with ErT(w) equal to false). Let us now consider dependent sub-
predicates. Let v a node with a dependent sub-predicate sp(v) = true. Then ErT(v) = true,
and there is at least one neighbor u of v such that some local variable(s) of u is not consistent
with some variable(s) of v. In this case, since the sub-predicate sp is dependent, we also have
sp(u) = true, as, if one variable of v is not consistent with the corresponding variable of u,
then the converse is also true. Therefore, sp(u) is true, and thus ErT(u) is true as well. As
a consequence, nodes u and v can only apply the command Reset. Now let us consider the
neighbor w of v distinct from u, and the neighbor y of u distinct from v. The predicates ErT(w)
and ErT(y) may be equal to false, in which case w and y can execute a command different from
Reset. Nevertheless, the execution of one command by node w or y, or both, cannot modify
the variables of v and u. Therefore, the inconsistency between the local variables of v and u
remains until one of them apply the reset command.
Let us denote by X the set of nodes v such that ErT(v) = true (see predicate in 3.3.4)
and ErT(y) = false for every y ∈ Nv. Moreover, let us denote by Y the set of nodes v such
that ErT(v) = true and there exists y ∈ Nv such that ErT(y) = true. Let γ0 denote the initial
configuration of the system. Since the scheduler is weakly fair, all nodes in X are scheduled for
execution at round 1. Moreover all nodes in Y are also scheduled at round 1. According to rule
RError (see algorithm in Figure 1), every node v ∈ X ∪ Y executes Reset(v), and thus ErT(v)
becomes false for all these nodes as well as for all their neighbors (indeed, if one neighbor of v
is reset, then ErT(v) is false). Therefore, the configuration γ1 at time 1 satisfies
Ψ(γ1) = 0.
Thus, starting from any arbitrary initial configuration γ0, the system reaches a configuration
γ1 ∈ ΓTEF in just one round. 2
Lemma 2 ΓTEF is closed.
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Proof. We prove that, starting from a configuration where ΓTEF holds, algorithm CLE
preserves that ErNd(v), ErPhase, ErBp, ErControl, and ErMem all remain false. Let us consider these
predicates one by one, starting with ErNd(v). We show that, for all v ∈ V , algorithm CLE
keeps predicate ErNd(v) to false starting from a configuration where ΓTEF. In configuration ΓTEF,
each node v has ErNd(v) = false, that is, each node v must satisfy one of the three predicates
Root(v), PassNd(v), and maxElec(v). Moreover, if v satisfies PassNd(v) = true, then v must
have a correct distance (see the definition of Erd(v)). We consider the different commands that
can be executed by the algorithm.
• If a node v executes the commandReset due to a hyper-node distance error, i.e., ErHyper(v) =
true, or to an election error, i.e., ErElec(v) = true, then the predicate maxElec(v) becomes
true, and, as a consequence, ErNd(v) remains false. Let node u be a neighbor of v. Pred-
icate ErT(u) remains false because u has at least one neighbor that applied the reset
command.
• A reset node v, i.e., a node v such that dv = -1 and maxElec(v) = true, can only execute
the command Start(v). When this command has been executed, the predicate Root(v)
becomes true, and dv becomes null.
• For the command Inc and StartdB, we note that the predicate Root(v) remains true if
dv = 0 since no rule modifies the variables used in Root(v).
• A candidate node v, i.e., a node v such that dv = 0 and Root(v) = true, can only execute
the command Passive(v). This command is activated if and only if v has a “better”
neighbor u = Best(v). In this case, v adjusts dv with respect to du. As a consequence,
we get Erd(v) = false. Moreover, when the command Passive(v) has been executed, the
predicate Root(v) becomes false, and the predicate PassNd(v) becomes true. Therefore,
ErNd(v) remains false.
• The predicate PassNd(v) remains true because v executes the commands corresponding
to RPassive, RUpdate, or RHyperNd. We examine each of these different commands.
– The commands corresponding to the rule RHyperNd do not change the variables used
by PassNd(v) and Erd(v). Hence ErNd(v) remains false.
– Note that for any two node u and v where u is a child of v, node u can only execute
Update(u) after v has executed Update(v). The command Update(v) keeps the pred-
icate PassNd(v) = true because this command does not change the variables leaderv,
pv, dv, and B̂v. Moreover, a node v updates its variables according to the predicate
T.Update(v) that satisfies B̂v = B̂pv . So, after Update(v) has been performed, we
have Bit-Strongv = B̂v. The command Update(v) does not modify the parent w of
node v. Let u be the neighbor of v different from w. If u and w do not execute
the command Passive, then Best(v) = ∅ and Erd(v) remains false. Note that the
variable Controlv is not used in predicates PassNd(v) and Erd(v). If the parent w of v
executes the command Update(w), then dw does not change, and, as a consequence,
Erd(v) remains false.
– Let u be the neighbor of v such that u = Best(v). If v executes Passive(v), then
dv = du+1. Therefore, the new distance of v is correct by definition of Erd. Moreover
since u = Best(v), we have B̂u ≥ Bit(1, Idv). If the parent u of v executes Passive(u)
and updates dv, then u = Best(v), and thus Best(v) 6= ∅. As a consequence,
PassNd(v) remains true and Erd remains false.
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We now move on to predicate ErPhase. We show that, for every v ∈ V , algorithm CLE
keeps predicate ErPhase(v) = false. An error is detected if and only if the difference between
the phases of two nodes is larger than one. As before, we consider the different commands that
can be executed, one by one, according to the value of dv.
• Let v be a node with dv = −1 and Phasev = 0. In this case, node v can only execute the
command Start, which sets v’s phase to zero. In accordance with the rule RStart, each
neighbor u of v has either reset (i.e., Phaseu = 0) or restarted (i.e., Phaseu = 1), which
keeps ErPhase(v) = false.
• Let v be a node with dv = 0 and Phasev = i, for some i ≥ 0. In this case, node v can only
execute the command Passive(v) or the command Inc(v). In the latter case, the phase i
of v can only be increased if Phaseu = i of i+ 1 for every neighbor u of v. Therefore, the
command Inc(v) maintains ErPhase(v) = false. We now consider command Passive(v).
When a v node chooses a neighbor u = Best(v) with B̂u > B̂v, the phase of u is equal
to 1. Let us consider the subtree Tr rooted in r, and containing the node v, with possibly
v = r. The node r increases its phase i if and only if all its descendants are in phase i,
and the neighbors of the leaves of Tr are in phase i or i+ 1 (see the predicates WaveB and
UpBack ). As a consequence, the difference of phases between u = Best(v) and v is at most
one. This keeps ErPhase(v) = false. If B̂u = B̂v, then node u = Best(v) if its phase is the
same as v, and its bit-position is greater than the bit-position of v. Therefore, ErPhase(v)
remains false.
• Let v be a passive node with dv > 0 and Phasev = i, for some i ≥ 0. Only two commands
can change the phase Phasev: the command Passive(v), and the command Update(v).
The command Passive(v) has already be considered in the previous item. Let us thus
now consider the command Update(v), and let r be the root of the subtree Tr containing
v. When r increases its phase, all nodes in Tr have their phase equal to i. Let Lr be the
set of leaves of Tr. All nodes u such that u /∈ Tr with u ∈ Nx for some x ∈ Lr have their
phase equal either to i or to i+ 1 (this is ensured by the control variable Controlv). As a
consequence, if v moves to phase i + 1, then its parent is at phase i + 1. If v 6∈ Lr, then
its children are at phase i. If v ∈ Lr then the neighbors of v not in Tr remain at phase i
or at phase i+ 1. Therefore, ErPhase(v) remains false.
We now move on to predicate ErBp. We show that, for every v ∈ V , algorithm CLE keeps
predicate ErBp(v) = false. The predicate ErBp(v) is satisfied if and only if dv > 0. A node v
that is passive at phase i satisfies ErBp(v) = false if and only if v has not “better” neighbor
(i.e., Best(v) = ∅), none of its neighbors are at phase i+ 1 (i.e., SupPh(v) = ∅), and at least one
of its neighbors is at the same phase i with the same bit position as v. Note that, the commands
corresponding to the rule RHyperNd do not change the variables used by the predicate ErBp(v). As
a consequence, ErBp(v) remains false. The only commands that may change ErBp are commands
Update, and Passive. Let us again consider the subtree Tr rooted in r containing v, and let
i be the current phase of the nodes in Tr. Note that, in this case, ErBp(v) is false because the
parent of v has a same phase as v, and the same bit-position as v. If r increases its phase,
then the ancestors of v update their phase top-down. Hence, when the parent u of v updates
its phase, the predicate SupPh(v) becomes not empty. If r becomes passive, then ancestors of
v have a “better” neighbor, and thus they set their variables according to the variables of their
“better” neighbors. When the parent u of v executes the command Passive(u), the predicate
Best(v) becomes not empty. Hence, in all cases, ErBp(v) remains false.
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We now turn our attention to predicate ErControl. We prove that, for every v ∈ V , algorithm
CLE keeps predicate ErControl(v) to false. The boolean Controlv can only be modified by the
command Update because of predicate T.Update. Controlv is used to control the updates of
a subtree. Let us consider T the subtree containing v, and let r be the root of T . The
updating process starts at node r, and all the descendants of r set their variables Control = 0
top-down. The process ends at the leaves of the subtree T that launch the acknowledgement
Control = 1 propagated bottom-up to the root. Hence, when a node v satisfies Controlv = 1, all
its descendants also satisfy Control = 1, and, conversely, when a node v satisfies Controlv = 0,
all its ancestors satisfy Control = 0. Therefore, ErControl(v) is kept to false.
Finally, we consider the predicate ErMem, and prove that, for every v ∈ V , algorithm CLE
keeps predicate ErMem to false. The predicate ErMem is satisfied if and only if dv ≥ 0. The
commands Inc(v), StartdB(v), and Update(v) do not change the variables Addv and HCv.
Thus ErMem(v) remains false. The command Passive is executed during the construction of
the spanning tree, when the hyper-nodes are set. Note that a hyper-node does not start the
binary addition before it is properly set. When a node v becomes passive with Best(v) = u, the
variables Addv and HCv are set to ⊥. As a consequence, the predicate ErMAdd(v) is false. Assume
that v joins a hyper-node or that v is the first node of a hyper-node. In both cases, v has no
children. Thus, ErPL(v) and ErHC(v) remain false. A neighbor w of v with pw = v has now
Best(w) = v. As a consequence the three predicates ErMAdd(w), ErPL(w) and ErHC(w) remain
false. We complete the proof by analyzing all commands corresponding to the rule RHyperNd.
• Let us consider the predicate ErMAdd(v) at some node v. In this predicate, Addv is compared
to Addu for every child u of v. Only two commands change Addv: BinAdd and Broad. The
command BinAdd assigns to Add the values + or ok in a bottom-up manner, starting at
all nodes v satisfying dv = B̂v. The command Broad sets Add to ⊥ in top-down manner,
starting at all nodes v with dv = 1. As a consequence, ErMAdd(v) remains false.
• Let us consider the predicate ErPL(v). In this predicate, PLv is compared to PLpv . Only
two commands can change PLv: Broad and CleanM . The command Broad sets PL in
a top-down manner starting at every node v with dv = 1. The command CleanM sets
PL to ⊥ whenever a child u of a node v has PLu = PLv. Let us consider a hyper-node
X = {x1, . . . , xk}. At the end of the binary addition, all the variables PL of X are
equal to ⊥. The command Broad(x1) sets PLx1 [0] = dx1 , which keeps ErPL(x1) at false
because dx1 = 1. The predicate Broadp in the command Broad(x2) sets PLx2 = PLx1 that
maintains ErPL(x2) false because PLx2 [0] = dx1 . The node x1 can execute the command
CleanM that sets PLx1 = ⊥. In this case, ErPL(x2) remains false. The node x3 executes
Broad(x3) and sets PLx3 [0] = dx1 . Then, x2 sets PLx2 [0] = dx2 and ErPL(x2) remains
false. This process is repeated in a top-down manner for all the nodes in X. Hence, the
algorithm CLE keeps ErPL(v) = false for every node v.
• Finally, let us consider the predicate ErHC(v). In this predicate, HCv is compared to
HCpv and HCu for every child u of v. The hyper-node distance is checked in a top-down
manner. For that purpose, two commands are used: Verif and CleanM . Let us consider
a hyper-node X = {x1, . . . , xk}. At the beginning of the hyper-node distance verification,
all the variables HC of X are equal to ⊥. According to the predicate T.Verif, every
node xi, 1 < i ≤ k, sets HCxi [0] = HCxi−1 [0] if and only if either HCpxi [0] = dxi , or
HCpxi [0] = HCxi [0] + 1. In both cases ErHC(v) remains false.
2
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We now define Predicate ΓCF (for Cycle Free), which ensures that no cycles induced by the
p variable remain in the network. Let λ : Γ× V → N be the function defined by:
λ(γ, v) = |dBPX − dBX − 1|
Where X is an hyper-node, and PX is the hyper-node parent of X (recall that dBX is an integer
whose binary representation is dBx1 , . . . , dBxk where k = B̂). Let Λ : Γ → N be the function
defined by:
Λ(γ) =
∑
v∈V
λ(γ, v).
Let φ : Γ× V → N be the function defined by:
φ(γ, v) =
{
|dpv − dv − 1| if dpv < B̂v
|dv − 1| if dpv = B̂v
Let Φ : Γ→ N be the function defined by
Φ(γ) =
∑
v∈V
φ(γ, v).
We define
ΓCF = {γ ∈ Γ : Ψ(γ) = Φ(γ) = Λ(γ) = 0 and L(γ) > 0}.
Lemma 3 ΓTEF . ΓCF in O(n log n) rounds.
Proof. Let us consider an initial configuration γ0 ∈ ΓTEF such that the overlay structure
induced by the parent variables pv, v ∈ V , forms a cycle C. The cycle C necessarily contains all
nodes, which implies that all nodes have non empty pointers parent. Moreover, since γ0 ∈ ΓTEF,
we get that, for every nodes v, leaderv = 0. Thus L(γ0) = 0.
Let ξ : Γ× V → N be the function defined by:
ξ(γ, v) = |MaxB̂− B̂v|
for every γ ∈ Γ, and every v ∈ V , where MaxB̂ = max{B̂v | v ∈ V}. Let then Ξ : Γ→ N be the
function defined by,
Ξ(γ) =
∑
v∈V
ξ(γ, v)
We define
ΓΞ = {γ ∈ Γ : Ξ(γ) = 0}.
Claim: Ξ(γ0) = 0.
Let us assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that Ξ(γ0) 6= 0. Let
X = {v ∈ V | B̂v = MaxB̂}.
Since Ξ(γ0) 6= 0, we have X 6= V . Moreover, since C contains all nodes, we have that pv 6= ∅
for every v ∈ V , and there is at least one node x ∈ X such that px /∈ X. This node x satisfies
B̂x 6= B̂px . In this case, PassNd(x) = false and ErNd(x) = true, which contradicts the fact that
γ0 ∈ ΓTEF. Therefore, Ξ(γ0) = 0.
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Now, let pi : Γ× V → N be the function defined by:
pi(γ, v) = |Bit-Strongv − MaxB̂|+ |Phasev − MaxPh|+ |Bit-Positionv − maxBp|+ |Controlv − maxC|
where
MaxPh = max{Phasev, v ∈ V}
MaxPhNd = {v ∈ V | Phasev = MaxPh}
MaxBp = max{Bit-Positionv, v ∈ MaxPhNd}
MaxBpNd = {v ∈ MaxPhNd | Bit-Positionv = MaxBp}
MaxC = max{Controlv, v ∈ MaxPhNd}.
Beside, let us define the quadruplet
MaxElec = (MaxB̂, MaxPh, MaxBp, MaxC),
and the function Π : Γ→ N such that
Π(γ) =
∑
v∈V
pi(γ, v).
We define
ΓΠ = {γ ∈ Γ : Π(γ) = 0}.
Claim: Π(γ0) = 0.
Recall that γ0 ∈ ΓTEF, Ξ(γ0) = 0, and L(γ0) = 0. Assume for the purpose of contradiction
that Π(γ0) 6= 0. Let
X = {v ∈ V | Elecv = MaxElec}.
A direct consequence of Π(γ0) 6= 0 is that X 6= V and |X| < n. Since the cycle C contains
all nodes, we have that, for every v ∈ V , pv 6= ∅, and there is at least one node x ∈ X such
that px /∈ X. We denote by y = px the parent of x, and we consider the variables Bit-Strongx,
Phasex, Bit-Positionx, and Controlx.
We have Bit-Strongx = B̂x because otherwise PassNd(v) = false, in contradiction with
γ0 ∈ ΓTEF. Therefore Bit-Strongx = Bit-Strongy because Ξ(γ0) = 0.
If |Phasex−Phasey| > 1 then x or y detects an error (see the predicate ErPhase(v)), and thus
γ0 /∈ ΓTEF. If |Phasex − Phasey| = 1, then, since y /∈ X, we have Phasex = Phasey + 1. Thus y
cannot be a parent of x (see the predicate Cohp). Thus γ0 /∈ ΓTEF. Therefore, Phasex = Phasey.
We now turn our attention to the variable Bit-Positionx. If |X| = 1 then ErBp(x) = true
because, on the one hand, x has no neighbors z such that Phasez = Phasex and Bit-Positionz =
Bit-Positionx, and, on the other hand, x has no neighbors z such that Phasez = Phasex + 1 and
z = Bestx (see predicate Best). Thus, if |X| = 1 then γ0 /∈ ΓTEF. Therefore, |X| > 1. Since
Phasex = Phasey we have Bit-Positionx = Bit-Positiony because otherwise y cannot be a parent
of x (see the predicate Cohp). Therefore Bit-Positionx = Bit-Positiony.
Finally, we consider Controlx, and show Controlx = Controly. Assume that Controlx 6=
Controly. Then |X| > 1 because otherwise Predicate ErControl(x) would be true, in contradiction
with γ0 ∈ ΓTEF. Moreover, if Controly = 1 and Controlx = 0, then ErControl(x) = true and
ErControl(y) = true, again contradicting γ0 ∈ ΓTEF. If Controly = 0 and Controlx = 1 then let
x′ ∈ X be a descendent of x whose child x′′ /∈ X. In this case, Controlx′ = 1 and Controlx′′ = 0,
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hence Predicate ErControl(x
′) = true, in contradiction with γ ∈ ΓTEF. Therefore Controlx =
Controly.
Since Bit-Strongx = Bit-Strongy, Phasex = Phasey, Bit-Positionx = Bit-Positiony, and Controlx =
Controly, we obtain that y ∈ X, in contradiction with px /∈ X. As a consequence, Π(γ0) = 0,
which complete the proof of the claim.
An important consequence of Π(γ0) = 0 is that, for every node v, we have Elecv = MaxElec.
Claim: Φ(γ0) = 0.
Again, the proof is by contradiction, assuming Φ(γ0) 6= 0. Since L(γ) = 0, there are no
candidates for being the root of the tree. Thus Predicate T.Inc(v) = false for every node v,
and therefore the command Inc(v) cannot be executed at any node v. As a consequence, all
nodes are passive (i.e., ∀v ∈ V : PassNd(v) = true). In addition, since Elecv = MaxElec for
every v ∈ V , we also get that the commands Passive(v) and Update(v) cannot be executed
at any node v. Since Φ(γ0) 6= 0, there exists at least one passive node v that detects an error
between its distance and the distance of its parent (see predicate Erd(v)). Hence, for that node
v, the predicates PassNd(v) and ErNd(v) are both true, which is a contradiction with γ0 ∈ ΓTEF.
Thus Φ(γ0) = 0.
We are now ready to show that, if the initial configuration γ0 contains a cycle, then Algorithm
CLE detects an error in O(n log n) rounds.
Since Φ(γ0) = 0, we necessarily have that n is a multiple of MaxB̂, and that there are n/MaxB̂
hyper-nodes. Since all nodes are passive in γ0, the only commands that can be executed by
some node(s) are related to the distance verification between hyper-nodes, that is Commands
BinAdd(v),Broad(v),Verif(v) and CleanM(v). More specifically, the only nodes that can
possibly be activated in γ0 are the nodes v such that dv = B̂v.
For every hyper-node X = (x1, x2, . . . , xk), where k = MaxB̂, since the scheduler is weakly
fair, predicate T.Add(xk) = true, and xk executes the command BinAdd(xk) at round 1. This
yields the execution of the binary addition. The binary addition occurs from xk to x1, and
every node in each hyper-node X eventually takes value ”+” or ”ok” once MaxB̂ rounds has
been performed. Now, if dBx1 = 1 and Addx1 = +, then an error is detected since the binary
addition overflows beyond the limit of MaxB̂ bits (see ErMAdd(v)).
Node x1 starts the verification process that propagates from x1 to xk. Fix any hyper-node
X = (x1, x2, . . . , xk), and let us denote by Y the hyper-node child of X in the current config-
uration at round MaxB̂. Node x1 computes the values of dBy1 (see the predicate T.Broad, and
the command Broad). This value is broadcast from x1 to xk (see the predicate T.Broad, and
the command Broad). Node y1 checks whether PLxk [1] = dBy1 . If it is the case, then the verifi-
cation process for all other nodes in Y carries on (see the predicate T.Verif and the command
Verif). Otherwise y1 detects an error (see ErHyper(v)). Thanks to Predicates T.Add, T.Broad,
and T.Verif, and to commands BinAdd, Broad, and Verif every node in Y are eventually
checked, after an additional MaxB̂ rounds. The total number of rounds for checking hyper-
nodes is the following: there are n/blog nc hyper-nodes, each hyper-node performs verification
in O(blog nc) rounds, so the overall process takes O(n log n) rounds.
To sum-up, if the configuration γ0 contains a cycle, then at least one hyper-node detects an
error in a O(n log n) rounds.
Finally, if L(γ0) = 0 in an arbitrary configuration, then the algorithm CLE detects an error
in O(n log n) rounds, and, by Lemma 1, the system reaches a configuration in ΓCF. 2
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Lemma 4 ΓCF is closed.
Proof. Let us consider a configuration γ ∈ ΓCF. We already noticed in the proof of Lemma 2
that Algorithm CLE preserves coherent distances (i.e., Φ(γ) = 0), and does not introduce
trivial errors (i.e., Ψ(γ) = 0). Moreover, in the proof of Lemma 3, we have explained that
the hyper-node distance verification correctly reports errors, if any. The variable dB is only
modified by the command Passive. In the sequel, we use the wording “v joins Tr” when a node
v executes the command Passive, and the pointer pv of v points to a node in the subtree Tr
rooted at r.
We denote by X the set of candidate nodes. Let us first consider a node v (in X or not),
and a root r ∈ X such that dv ≤ blog nc, and v joins Tr when r increases its phase from i − 1
to i, for some i. Thanks to Predicate T.StartdB, and to command StartdB, node r publishes
first the bit for the node at distance 1 from r. In other words, PLr = (1, 0). When any node v
at distance 1 joins Tr, v sets dBv = PLr[1], and then v informs r about the updating of dB by
setting PLv = PLr. At this point, r can publish the bit for nodes at distance 2 (i.e., PLr = (2, 0)),
and so on until the distance reaches blog nc. Now, a node v joins Tr only if its candidate parent
publishes the bit that corresponds to the binary representation of the distance between v and
r. In other words, for any node u, if du = k with k < blog nc then Bit-Strongu must be equal
to k + 1. This enables to maintain Λ(γ) = 0. When k reaches blog nc, a hyper-node is created.
Then, a binary addition process is carried out, and computes the bit for v when v joins Tr.
This process maintains Λ(γ) = 0, and, as a direct consequence L(γ) remains greater than 0. To
conclude, algorithm CLE keeps Ψ(γ) = 0, Φ(γ) = 0, Λ(γ) = 0, and L(γ) > 0. 2
We now introduce Predicate ΓIEF (for Impostor Error Free), which ensures that the currently
elected leader is not an impostor. Let ρ : Γ× V → N be the function defined by:
ρ(γ, v) = |maxFB− B̂v|
where maxFB = max{Bit(1, Idv) | v ∈ V }. Let P : Γ→ N be the function defined by
P(γ) =
∑
v∈V
ρ(γ, v).
We show that CLE reaches a legitimate configuration with respect to leader election if and only
if P(γ) = 0.
Let  : Γ× V → N be the function defined by:
(γ, v) =

0 if dv = 0 ∧ Bit(minPh, Idv) = Bit(minPh, l∗)
1 if dv = 0 ∧ Bit(minPh, Idv) < Bit(minPh, l∗)
0 otherwise
where minPh = min{Phasev | v ∈ V } and l∗ is the identity of the node with the maximum
identity. Let E : Γ→ N be the function defined by,
E(γ) =
∑
v∈V
(γ, v).
We define
ΓIEF = {γ ∈ Γ : Ψ(γ) = P(γ) = E(γ) = 0}.
Lemma 5 ΓCF . ΓIEF in O(n log n) rounds.
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Proof. Let us consider first an initial configuration γ ∈ ΓCF. We have observed in lemma 3
that being in ΓCF implies L(γ) > 0. Let us denote by `
∗ the node with maximum identity, and
X the set of the candidate nodes. Let us suppose that `∗ 6∈ X. Let us denote by ` the node
with the maximum identity in X. In the worst case, all the sub-spanning tree merge in a unique
spanning tree rooted at `. Thus, let us suppose that γ is a configuration where the network is
spanned by an unique tree rooted in `. In this case d` = 0 and du > 0 for every node u 6= `.
Let us assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that P(γ) 6= 0. If the tree is rooted at
`, then every node must have the same B̂ as `. Since ` is a root, B̂` = Bit(1, Id`). Hence,
B̂` 6= maxFB (because P(γ) 6= 0). Now, B̂` cannot be larger than maxFB, so there exists v such
that B̂v = maxFB, and PassNd(v) is true. This contradicts γ ∈ ΓTEF, so we can conclude that
P(γ) = 0.
Since ` and `∗ have the same number of bits, there must exist one phase where the bit-
position of `∗ is larger than the bit-position of `. More formally, there exists i, 1 < i ≤ blog nc+1,
such that, for every j < i, we have Bit(j, Id`) = Bit(j, Id`∗), and, for every k ≥ i, we have
Bit(k, Id`) < Bit(k, Id`∗). Note that i > 1, because, in ΓTEF, predicate PassNd must be true.
The worst case with respect to time complexity is for i = blog nc+ 1, and the arbitrary initial
configuration starts at phase 2. In this case, only RRoot can be activated for `, and only the rule
RNode for the other nodes (in parallel to the hyper-node distance verification). Node ` executes
the command Inc(`) for blog nc + 1 − 2 times. After each execution of command Inc, every
node executing this command updates the variable Elec in a top-down manner (see Predicate
T.Update and command Update). This updating process takes at most n rounds. When all
nodes have the same election values, a bottom-up control process is initiated (see Predicate
T.Update and command Update). This process takes at most n rounds. After that, ` increases
its phase, and the same process is repeated. At the last phase, ErElec(`
∗) is true, and an error
is detected. Therefore, if the system contains a impostor leader, then an error is detected in
O(n log n) rounds. 2
Lemma 6 ΓIEF is closed.
Proof. Let γ ∈ ΓIEF, with L(γ) > 0. Let X be the set of candidate leaders (i.e., for every
x ∈ X, Root(x) = true). Let x ∈ X, and let T(x,i) be the subtree rooted at x during phase i. For
a node v ∈ T(x,i), we have that (1) either Bit-Strongv < Bit-Strongx or Bit-Strongv = Bit-Strongx,
and (2) Bit(j, Idv) < Bit(j, Idx) for every j ≤ i. Moreover, for any two candidates leaders x1 and
x2, we have that, at phase i, Bit-Strongx1 = Bit-Strongx2 , and Bit(j, Idx1) = Bit(j, Idx2) for evry
j ≤ i. Let i be such that T(x1,i) and T(x2,i) have adjacent nodes. Let x′1 ∈ T(x1,i) and x′2 ∈ T(x2,i)
be two nodes such that x′1 is adjacent to x′2. If, at phase i+ 1, Bit(i+ 1, Idx1) > Bit(i+ 1, Idx2),
then the nodes of T(x1,i) and T(x2,i) activated by Predicate T.Update executes Update. When
node x′1 reaches Elecx1 at phase i + 1, node x′2 becomes passive (cf. command Passive) and
selects node x′1 as its parent. In a bottom-up fashion, every node of T(x2,i) joins the subtree
T(x1,i+1) (cf. command Passive), and, eventually, x2 becomes passive and joins T(x1,i+1). By
this process, for every node v in T(x1,i+1), we have (1) either Bit-Strongv < Bit-Strongx1 or
Bit-Strongv = Bit-Strongx1 , and (2) Bit(j, Idv) < Bit(j, Idx1) for every j ≤ i+ 1. This process is
repeated until phase blog nc, where there remains a single leader in the network. 2
Note that if a node executes Reset, and since the scheduler is weakly fair, at most n rounds
later all nodes have executed Reset.
Lemma 7 ΓIEF . ΓLE in O(n log
2 n) rounds.
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Proof. We know by Lemma 4 that ΓCF is closed, and we know by Lemma 6 that ΓIEF is
closed. Moreover the proof of Lemma 6 provided details about the election process at each
phase. Let γ ∈ ΓIEF at round t. Moreover, let us suppose that γ ∈ ΓCF. That is, L(γ) > 0.
More precisely, let i, 1 ≤ i ≤ blog nc + 1, denote the smallest phase counter in the network,
among all nodes. At phase i, there are at most n/2i−1 candidate leaders (i.e., at most this
many roots). Thus, L(γ) = n/2i−1 at phase i. We have studied in the proof of Lemma 5
how Algorithm CLE performs the election process. After O(n log n) rounds, Phase i + 1 is
completed, and the system reaches some configuration γ′. At this point, there remain at most
n/2i candidate leaders. Since L(γ′) ≤ n/2i, we get that
L(γ′) < L(γ).
The number of phases is upper bounded by blog nc + 1. At phase blog nc + 1, we reach a
configuration γ′′ satisfying L(γ′′) = 1. A direct consequence of Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 is that
only the node `∗ with maximum identity has leader`∗ = 1. Every other node v has leaderv = 0.
Moreover, for every node v 6= `∗, we have pv 6= ∅, and the structure induced by the pointers
pv, for all v 6= `∗ forms a spanning tree rooted in `∗. Regarding time complexity, our algorithm
takes O(n log n) rounds to detect an impostor leader, O(n) rounds to reset the system after the
detection of an error, and O(n log2 n) rounds to elect the leader. Therefore, in total, Algorithm
CLE performs O(n log2 n) rounds to converge to the leader specification. 2
Lemma 8 ΓLE is closed.
Proof. The rule RPassive(v) is the only rule performed by v that modifies the distance and
the leader variables of node v. Let `∗ be the node with the maximum identity. As a direct
consequence of Lemma 7, in the initial configuration, `∗ is the only node that has d`∗ = 0 and
leader`∗ = 1. In other words `
∗ is the only elected node. Therefore, `∗changes the phase of the
system by increasing the current phase, or by restarting from phase 1 (see predicate T.Inc and
command Inc). Thus, every node v satisfies Bit-Strongv ≤ Bit-Strong`∗ . Moreover, for every
phase i, 1 ≤ i ≤ blog nc+1, every node v satisfies Bit(i, Idv) < Bit-Position`∗ . Hence, every node
can only executes the command Update. Finally, nodes never change their distance, parent,
and leader variables. 2
4.1 Memory requirements
Lemma 9 Algorithm CLE use O(log log n) bits of memory per node.
Proof. Algorithm CLE has two types of variables: the variables that use a constant number
of bits, and those that use O(log log n) bits. Variables of the first type are:
pv ∈ {∅, 0, 1}, dBv ∈ {0, 1}, Addv ∈ {+, ok, ∅}, and leaderv ∈ {0, 1}.
Variables of the second type are:
B̂v ∈ {1, ..., blog nc}, PLv ∈ {1, ..., blog nc} × {0, 1}, HCv ∈ {1, ..., blog nc} × {0, 1},
and
Elecv ∈ {1, ..., blog nc} × {1, ..., blog nc} × {1, ..., blog nc} × {0, 1}.
Hence, CLE uses O(log log n) bits of memory per node. 2
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that, in the state model, with a weakly fair distributed sched-
uler, one can elect a leader in a ring with a (non-silent) self-stabilizing algorithm using only
O(log log n) bits of memory per node. It is known that one cannot do the same using only O(1)
bits of memory per node (see [8]). An intriguing question is whether one can perform leader
election in the same framework as in this paper, using just o(log log n) bits per node, and, if yes,
to what extend can the memory requirement for (non silent) leader election being reduced. A
natural candidate function for the minimum memory requirement for leader election is O(log∗ n)
bits per node, by applying the techniques in this paper recursively. This however seems to be
non trivial, as self-stabilization has to be maintained at every level of the recursion.
References
[1] J. Adamek, M. Nesterenko, and S. Tixeuil. Using abstract simulation for performance
evaluation of stabilizing algorithms: The case of propagation of information with feedback.
In SSS 2012, LNCS. Springer, 2012.
[2] Y. Afek and A. Bremler-Barr. Self-stabilizing unidirectional network algorithms by power
supply. Chicago J. Theor. Comput. Sci., 1998.
[3] A. Arora and M. G. Gouda. Distributed reset. IEEE Trans. Computers, 43(9):1026–1038,
1994.
[4] M. Arumugam and S. S. Kulkarni. Prose: A programming tool for rapid prototyping of
sensor networks. In S-CUBE, pages 158–173, 2009.
[5] B. Awerbuch, S. Kutten, Y. Mansour, B. Patt-Shamir, and G. Varghese. A time-optimal
self-stabilizing synchronizer using a phase clock. IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput.,
4(3):180–190, 2007.
[6] B. Awerbuch and R. Ostrovsky. Memory-efficient and self-stabilizing network reset. In
PODC, pages 254–263. ACM, 1994.
[7] J. Beauquier, S. Delae¨t, S. Dolev, and S. Tixeuil. Transient fault detectors. Distributed
Computing, 20(1):39–51, June 2007.
[8] J. Beauquier, M. Gradinariu, and C. Johnen. Randomized self-stabilizing and space optimal
leader election under arbitrary scheduler on rings. Distributed Computing, 20(1):75–93,
January 2007.
[9] L. Blin and S. Tixeuil. Brief announcement: deterministic self-stabilizing leader election
with o(log log n)-bits. In Proceedings of the 32st ACM Symposium on Principles of Dis-
tributed Computing, (PODC13), pages 125–127, 2013.
[10] L. Blin and S. Tixeuil. Compact deterministic self-stabilizing leader election: The exponen-
tial advantage of being talkative. In Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on
Distributed Computing (DISC 2013), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages
76–90. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2013.
[11] Y. Choi and M. G. Gouda. A state-based model of sensor protocols. Theor. Comput. Sci.,
458:61–75, 2012.
27
[12] A. R. Dalton, W. P. McCartney, K. Ghosh Dastidar, J. O. Hallstrom, N. Sridhar, T. Her-
man, W. Leal, A. Arora, and M. G. Gouda. Desal alpha: An implementation of the
dynamic embedded sensor-actuator language. In ICCCN, pages 541–547. IEEE, 2008.
[13] A. Kumar Datta, L. L. Larmore, and P. Vemula. Self-stabilizing leader election in optimal
space under an arbitrary scheduler. TCS, 412(40):5541–5561, 2011.
[14] S. Devismes, T. Masuzawa, and S. Tixeuil. Communication efficiency in self-stabilizing
silent protocols. In ICDCS 2009, pages 474–481. IEEE Press, 2009.
[15] E. W. Dijkstra. Self-stabilizing systems in spite of distributed control. Commun. ACM,
17(11):643–644, 1974.
[16] S. Dolev. Self-stabilization. MIT Press, March 2000.
[17] S. Dolev, M. G. Gouda, and M. Schneider. Memory requirements for silent stabilization.
Acta Inf., 36(6):447–462, 1999.
[18] S. Dolev and T. Herman. Superstabilizing protocols for dynamic distributed systems.
Chicago J. Theor. Comput. Sci., 1997, 1997.
[19] S. Dolev, A. Israeli, and S. Moran. Resource bounds for self-stabilizing message-driven
protocols. SIAM J. Comput., 26(1):273–290, 1997.
[20] S. Dubois and S. Tixeuil. A taxonomy of daemons in self-stabilization. Technical Report
1110.0334, ArXiv eprint, October 2011.
[21] F. E. Fich and C. Johnen. A space optimal, deterministic, self-stabilizing, leader election
algorithm for unidirectional rings. In DISC, pages 224–239. Springer, 2001.
[22] M. G. Gouda, J. Arturo Cobb, and C. Huang. Fault masking in tri-redundant systems. In
SSS, LNCS, pages 304–313. Springer, 2006.
[23] T. Herman and S. V. Pemmaraju. Error-detecting codes and fault-containing self-
stabilization. Inf. Process. Lett., 73(1-2):41–46, 2000.
[24] J. Hoepman. Self-stabilizing ring-orientation using constant space. Inf. Comput., 144(1):18–
39, 1998.
[25] A. Israeli and M. Jalfon. Uniform self-stabilizing ring orientation. Inf. Comput., 104(2):175–
196, 1993.
[26] G. Itkis and L. A. Levin. Fast and lean self-stabilizing asynchronous protocols. In FOCS,
pages 226–239. IEEE Computer Society, 1994.
[27] G. Itkis, C. Lin, and J. Simon. Deterministic, constant space, self-stabilizing leader election
on uniform rings. In WDAG, LNCS, pages 288–302. Springer, 1995.
[28] Amos Korman, Shay Kutten, and Toshimitsu Masuzawa. Fast and compact self stabilizing
verification, computation, and fault detection of an mst. In Proceedings of the 30th Annual
ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2011, pages 311–320,
2011.
[29] T. Masuzawa and S. Tixeuil. On bootstrapping topology knowledge in anonymous net-
works. ACM Transactions on Adaptive and Autonomous Systems, 4(1), 2009.
28
[30] A. J. Mayer, Y. Ofek, R.l Ostrovsky, and M. Yung. Self-stabilizing symmetry breaking in
constant-space (extended abstract). In STOC, pages 667–678, 1992.
[31] T. M. McGuire and M. G. Gouda. The Austin Protocol Compiler, volume 13 of Advances
in Information Security. Springer, 2005.
[32] S. Tixeuil. Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook, pages 26.1–26.45. CRC
Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009.
29
